

22, 1994

to base a naval strategy upon a flawed weapon like the Type VII U-boat. Of the roughly 39,000 U-boat sailors, "27,491 officers and men were killed at sea" (8). The men of the U-boat arm of the *Kriegsmarine* suffered a casualty rate of 70 percent, a ratio unequaled by any military branch in any country.

Kemp's book does suffer from two flaws that ought to be addressed in subsequent editions. The author provides only a two-page preface and a four-page bibliography. It would have been useful to know the author's methodology in approaching the primary sources he used to construct his narratives. Equally troubling is the lack of a critical bibliography that might provide a guide to the location and the nature of the primary sources available to those historians who might wish to pursue further research. Nevertheless, this is a reference work that will be of great interest to any naval historian.

LARRY L. PING, *Southern Utah University*

Philipp Gassert. *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933-1945* (Transatlantische Historische Studien, 7). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997. Pp. 415. DM 84.—

During the first ten years of its existence (1987-1997), the German Historical Institute in Washington has sponsored an impressive array of publications on the variegated relations between Germany and the United States, of which Philipp Gassert's 1996 Heidelberg dissertation is among the most original. Whereas previous authors, except for Hans Dieter Schäfer with whose conclusions Gassert repeatedly takes issue, have dealt mainly with traditional German-American diplomatic relations in the Hitler-Roosevelt period, Gassert's study is both broader and more culturally oriented. Not only does one-quarter of his book deal with the years before 1933 and such topics as the profoundly negative impact of Woodrow Wilson's role in the shaping of the Versailles peace settlement upon German attitudes towards the U.S. until well into World War II (Nazi propaganda agencies effectively depicted the eight principles of the 1941 Atlantic Charter signed by Churchill and FDR as merely a "badly plagiarized" [313] version of the infamous Fourteen Points which had supposedly tricked the Kaiser's government into laying down its arms). Gassert also examines very thoroughly the ideological implications for public opinion during the Third Reich of the debate over "Americanism" that began under the Weimar Republic. That is to say, did German attraction to or revulsion against characteristic features of the "American way of life"—for example, its socio-cultural presentation in Hollywood movies or, in economic terms, the process of industrial rationalization, high wages and productivity associated with Henry Ford senior—significantly influence the arguments and success of Goebbels and others seeking to control the popular reception in Germany

of everything concerning the United States? Gassert maintains persuasively that the Nazis followed earlier "reactionary modernist" (Jeffrey Herf) critics of America in praising the material accomplishments of the pre-Depression U.S. economy (there was no greater enthusiast for American-style motorization than Adolf Hitler) while rejecting the liberal-democratic political system that was its concomitant. With the onset of the economic crisis in 1929, however, German disillusionment with America, in particular the seeming inability of even the New Deal to cope with mass unemployment, grew not just among convinced Nazis. For his part the Führer, who believed that his regime could achieve European hegemony if it duplicated the population size and geographical extent of the U.S., also set out to emulate what he conceived as its racial dimension, albeit substituting primarily Jews for Negroes. But Nazi anti-Semitism, vividly revealed in the November 1938 "crystal night" pogrom, began the course of alienation between the two countries which, once Germany and England went to war a year later, almost inevitably meant American involvement at some point and in some fashion once again against the Reich. By 1945, ironically, most Germans were ready to welcome an Anglo-American occupation, the ultimate answer to Hitler's misconception of his trans-Atlantic rival and enemy.

This well-researched volume overlooks a few relevant topics, notably the share American authors like Sinclair Lewis and Thomas Wolfe had in determining Germans' views of the United States. Nevertheless, I can recommend it warmly.

LAWRENCE D. STOKES, *Dalhousie University*

Arieh J. Kochavi. *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Judgment*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. Pp. 312. Cloth \$34.95.

Since the 1960s, scholars have revealed a mixed Allied record in reacting to Axis crimes during World War II. Arieh Kochavi's work, which revisits the evolution of Allied postwar judicial policies, fits within this context and within recent work by Ulrich Brochagen and others on post-Nuremberg trial programs. He adds to the picture begun by Bradley F. Smith's *The American Road to Nuremberg* (1981) thanks primarily to the attention he gives to the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), which first advocated those principles that resulted in the first successful postwar judicial experiment.

The impetus for war crimes trials, Kochavi argues, did not come from the British or Americans, who have traditionally received the credit. The British facilitated the establishment of the UNWCC in October 1943, but mainly to pacify the governments-in-exile, which had urged action since 1940. The Soviets did not join the UNWCC for political reasons, but administered their own brand of justice